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THE SUPREME COURT STOPS STATE LAWS FROM COVERTLY DISFAVORING ARBITRATION,
ALLOWS STATE COURTS TO NARROWLY INTERPRET POWERS-OF-ATTORNEY: A COMMENT ON
KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. CLARK
By
Micah Mayotte*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark1 the Supreme Court held
Kentucky’s “clear statement” rule violated Section Two of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2
In Kindred, the Court addressed the issue of whether the FAA preempts a state law that
“requir[es] a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorneyin-fact can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.”3 The Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the clear statement rule did not violate the FAA because it does not “single out”4 arbitration,
but would affect any power-of-attorney authorizing an attorney-in-fact to “waive the principal’s
fundamental constitutional rights.”5 The Supreme Court expanded the scope of AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion6 by finding any state rule that “covertly” and disproportionately disfavors
arbitration violates the FAA.7
II.

BACKGROUND

Beverly Wellner held power-of-attorney for her husband Joe Wellner.8 The power-ofattorney provided Ms. Wellner with the authority, on her husband’s behalf, to “demand, sue for
collect, recover and receive all debts, monies, interests and demands whatsoever now due or that
may hereafter be or become due to [Mr. Wellner] (including the right to institute legal
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Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-29 (2017).
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9 U.S.C. § 2.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *I, Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017)
(No. 16-32), 2016 WL 3640709.
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Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 320 (Ky. 2016).
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7, Kindred, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 16-32).
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proceedings therefor). . . . To make . . . contracts of every nature.”9 Ms. Wellner used the powerof-attorney to sign admission documents for Mr. Wellner to reside at Winchester Centre,10 a
nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers L.P.11 Ms. Wellner also signed, on Mr.
Wellner’s behalf, an optional form, referred to by the court as the “Kindred Arbitration
Agreement,” which states, “[a]ny and all claims arising out of or in any way relating to . . . the
Resident’s stay . . . shall be submitted to alternate dispute resolution.”12 “Alternate dispute
resolution” is defined in the agreement as including “binding arbitration.”13
Additional relevant parties in the action included Olive and Janice Clark. Olive Clark
granted her daughter, Janis Clark, “full power for me and in my name, place, and stead, in [Janis
Clark’s] sole discretion, to transact, handle, and dispose of all matters affecting me and/or my
estate in any possible way . . . [and] [t]o institute or defend suits concerning my property or
rights.”14 Janis Clark signed all necessary documents to admit Olive Clark to Winchester Centre,
and also signed the optional “Kindred Arbitration Agreement.”15
After Joe Wellner and Olive Clark died, Beverly Wellner and Janis Clark brought
separate suits alleging personal injury, violations of Kentucky’s Long Term Care Facilities Act,
and wrongful death of a resident against Kindred Nursing Center L.P. in state court.16 Kindred
filed motions to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreements signed by
the plaintiffs. The trial court denied Kindred’s motions to dismiss and compel arbitration.17 The
trial court reasoned that Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., where the Kentucky Supreme Court
stated, “[a]bsent . . . express authorization addressing dispute resolution, authority to make such
a waiver [of the fundamental constitutional right to a trial] is not to be inferred lightly”
commanded its decision.18
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court consolidated the cases of Beverly Wellner and
Janis Clark.19 The Kentucky Supreme Court first considered the arbitration agreement as it
related to the wrongful death allegations. The Kentucky Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted Kentucky wrongful death law to mean that wrongful death claims “[do] not ‘derive
9

Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 319.
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Id. at 318.
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1423.
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Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 317.
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Id.
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Id. at 317-18.
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Id. at 317.
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Id. at 312.
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1423.
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Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky.
2012)).
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Id. at 312.
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from any claim on behalf of the decedent.’”20 Additionally, dispute resolution agreements do not
bind wrongful death beneficiaries because “the wrongful death action is not derivative . . . [but]
distinct from any [cause] that the deceased may have had if he had survived.” 21 The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a decedent’s arbitration agreements cannot bind beneficiaries, therefore,
Kindred could not compel arbitration for the wrongful death allegation in this case. 22 However,
unlike wrongful death claims, where the decedent has “no cognizable legal rights,” personal
injury and state law claims “belong to the decedents; and the respective estates.” 23 The Kentucky
Supreme Court reasoned that if the arbitration agreements were valid, then personal injury and
state law claims should be arbitrated.24 The Kentucky Supreme Court considered the text of the
powers-of-attorney to determine if authority to enter arbitration agreements was granted to Ms.
Wellner and Ms. Clark by their respective principals.25 The court held that Ms. Wellner’s powerof-attorney did not authorize her to enter arbitration agreements on Mr. Wellner’s behalf, but
Janis Clark’s power-of-attorney did grant that authority.26
The Kentucky Supreme Court then considered whether the powers-of-attorney were
consistent with state law. The Kentucky Constitution “declares the rights of access to the courts
and trial by jury to be ‘sacred.’”27 Based on this language in the Kentucky Constitution, the
Kentucky Supreme Court established the “clear statement” rule.28 That rule states, “without a
clear and convincing manifestation of the principal’s intention to do so, we will not infer the
delegation to an agent of the authority to waive a fundamental personal right so constitutionally
revered as the ‘ancient mode of trial by jury.’”29 Therefore, Kentucky law requires an “explicit
statement” in the power-of-attorney document for the agent to have the authority to relinquish
the principal’s fundamental constitutional rights.30 The Kentucky Supreme Court held the
arbitration agreements were not valid because neither Ms. Wellner nor Ms. Clark’s powers-ofattorney entitled them to enter their respective principals into arbitration agreements.31
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Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 600).
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Id. (quoting Moore v. Citizens Bank of Pikeville, 420 S.W. 2d 669, 672 (Ky. 1967)).
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Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 313 (citing Ky. Const. § 7).
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See Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1424; Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 328.
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1423.
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Kindred filed a motion to the Supreme Court requesting a Writ of Certiorari on the
question of “[w]hether the FAA preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by
requiring a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-infact can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.”32 Kindred did not challenge the finding
that wrongful death claims are “not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”33 Kindred
argued that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding is preempted by DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
which requires “states to ‘place[] arbitration contracts “on equal footing with all other
contracts.”’”34
III.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address whether Kentucky’s
clear statement rule singles out arbitration, in violation of the FAA.35 The Court analyzed this
case in three sections: (A) whether the clear statement rule “singles out” arbitration in a manner
that violates the FAA;36 (B) whether the FAA preempts any state rule that disfavors arbitration in
the contract formation stage;37 and (C) who should interpret the text of a power-of-attorney to
determine whether it allows the agent to bind the principal to an arbitration agreement.38
A.

The Clear Statement Rule Violates the FAA because it Disproportionately
Disfavors Arbitration.

The Court began its analysis of the clear statement rule by citing Section Two of the
FAA, which states that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”39 In AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that a lower court may not invalidate an arbitration agreement
based on legal rules that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that
an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”40 The Court also confirmed the AT&T Mobility standard,
that a state law violates the FAA if it “prohibit[s] outright the arbitration of a particular type of
claim.”41
32

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *I, Kindred, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 16-32).

33

Id. at *24 n.2.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *I, Kindred, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 16-32) (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
136 S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015)).
35

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1424-25.
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Id. at 1426.
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Id. at 1428.
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Id. at 1429.
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Id. at 1426 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1426 (quoting AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339).
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Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 341).
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The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the clear statement rule does not violate the FAA
because it does not single out arbitration, but would affect any contract regarding “fundamental
constitutional rights.”42 The Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished this case from Marmet
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown43 and AT&T Mobility because the clear statement rule is not
based on the validity of arbitration for a type of claim, but rather determines when the “agent[]
[has] authority to waive his principal’s constitutional right to access the courts and to trial by
jury.”44 The Kentucky Supreme Court framed the clear statement rule as declaring “an attorneyin-fact cannot act beyond the powers granted in the power-of-attorney document.”45
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected this argument because the intent of the
clear statement rule is “hostil[e] to arbitration.”46 The Court reasoned that the clear statement
rule is analogous to the hypothetical law illustrated in AT&T Mobility 47 that the Court stated
would be invalid.48 The Court reasoned that the other fundamental constitutional rights examples
the Kentucky Supreme Court provided49 are so infrequently litigated that the effect of the clear
statement rule is “applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans.”50 Additionally, the
Court reasoned that the Kentucky Supreme Court disproportionately disfavored arbitration
because of the right to trial by jury.51 Further, the intent of the Kentucky Supreme Court to single
out arbitration is inferred, because the clear statement rule never applied to settlement
agreements or bench trials in Kentucky.52 Although the clear statement rule does not only apply
to arbitration agreements, in a strict sense, the rule violates the spirit of the FAA by “covertly”

42

Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 331.

Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (holding that West Virginia’s policy of
not enforcing any “arbitration clause in a nursing home admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of
negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death” violated the FAA).
43

44

Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 331.

45
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1428 (quoting AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339).
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AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 342 (illustrating that any consumer arbitration agreement that prohibited judicially
monitored discovery would be unenforceable due to unconscionability or public policy, would have a
“disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements” and would violate the FAA).
48

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1426.

Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 328 (stating the clear statement rule would apply to “waiv[ing] the principal’s
civil rights; or the principal’s right to worship freely; or enter into an agreement to terminate the principal’s parental
rights; put her child up for adoption; consent to abort a pregnancy; consent to an arranged marriage; or bind the
principal to personal servitude”).
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Id. at 1427 (citing Ky. Const. § 7 (stating that “[t]he ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the
right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution”)).
51

Id. at 1430 n.1 (stating no explicit authorization is needed for attorneys-in-fact to waive a principal’s right to trial
by jury in settlement agreements or bench trials).
52

158

discriminating against arbitration.53 The Court held that the clear statement rule “hing[ed] on the
primary characteristics of an arbitration agreement,” therefore the rule failed to place arbitration
agreements on equal footing, in violation of the FAA as interpreted in DIRECTV.54
B.

The FAA Must be Applied When Determining Contract Formation.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that “States have free rein to decide . . .
whether [arbitration] contracts are validly created in the first instance.”55 The respondents argued
that courts must first determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and then apply the
FAA.56 The Supreme Court reasoned that the text of the FAA requiring arbitration agreements be
found “valid” except on “grounds as exist at law or in equity” must apply to contract formation.57
In AT&T Mobility the Court stated that a duress defense, which involves the formation stage of a
contract, would still violate the FAA if applied “in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.” 58 The
Court reasoned that applying the FAA to contract formation involving arbitration agreements is
necessary to prevent states from completely undermining the FAA.59 The Court noted that if the
FAA did not apply to the formation stage, then states could “blatant[ly] discriminat[e] against
arbitration” by “declaring everyone incompetent to sign arbitration agreements.”60 Therefore, the
Court held that the clear statement rule violated the FAA by “imped[ing] the ability for
attorneys-in-fact to enter arbitration agreements.”61
C.

While States Can Determine What Authority is Granted by Power-Of-Attorney
Documents, They Cannot Create Laws That Disfavor Arbitration.

The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the text of Ms. Wellner’s power-of-attorney was
not broad enough to grant her authority to enter arbitration agreements on Mr. Wellner’s
behalf.62 However, the court found that Janis Clark’s power-of-attorney was broad enough to
bind Olive Clark to arbitration but for the clear statement rule.63 The Supreme Court reasoned
53

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1426.
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Id. at 1424.
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Id. at 1428.
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Id.
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1430

58
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Id. at 1429.

62

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1429.
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that because the clear statement rule violates the FAA and was the only reason Kindred’s motion
was denied, the court “must now enforce the Clark-Kindred arbitration agreement.”64 The Court
reached a different conclusion regarding Ms. Wellner’s power-of-attorney because the lack of
authority to bind Mr. Wellner to arbitration may have been “independent of the court’s clearstatement rule.”65 The Court held that legal rules singling out an attorney-in-fact’s authority
regarding arbitration agreements fail to meet the FAA standard of “equal footing with all other
contracts.”66
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kindred expands the FAA’s reach into state laws that
affect arbitration.67 Before Kindred, AT&T Mobility limited state rules defining when “generally
applicable contract defenses” affect arbitration agreements.68 AT&T Mobility interpreted the
FAA to restrict states from creating legal rules that “prohibit[] outright the arbitration of a
particular type of claim” [emphasis added].69 AT&T Mobility illustrated that arbitration did not
have to be directly referred to for the state law to violate the FAA.70 Rather, a state law violates
the FAA if it “rel[ies] on the uniqueness of . . . arbitration” to determine the unenforceability of a
contract.71
In Kindred, the Court applied an even broader interpretation, holding that “covertly”
disfavoring arbitration violates the FAA.72 Based on this expansion, the Court found it necessary
to consider the intent behind the state law.73 In determining intent, the Court considered whether
case law or legislative history provided a purpose for the legal rule.74 In this case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated the purpose was to protect the “right to access the courts” because it is a
“sacred” right under the Kentucky Constitution.75 The Court also examined what other rights or
litigation may be affected by the state’s rule.76 After finding that other rights may be affected, the
64

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1429.

65

Id.

66

Id. (quoting DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468).
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1426.
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Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339).
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AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 341.

70

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1426.
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Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 341).
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Id.

73

Id. at 1427.
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Id.

75

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1427 (quoting Extendicare Homes, 478 S.W.3d at 327).
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Court considered whether arbitration was affected disproportionately to the other rights.77 Due to
the unlikelihood that the other rights suggested by the Kentucky Supreme Court would ever be
litigated, the Supreme Court described the clear statement rule’s application to them as “utterly
fanciful.”78 By delving this far into Kentucky case law to find any disfavor toward arbitration,
the Court shows its continued intent to interpret the FAA to preempt any state law that
“frustrates” arbitration’s ability to “streamline[] proceedings and expedit[e] results.”79
The instant case also clearly held that Section Two of the FAA preempts any state law
that disfavors arbitration in the contract formation stage.80 The Court discussed at length that the
FAA reaches any state action that would allow states to “undermine” or “wholly defeat” the
FAA.81 The Court inferred, based on the reasoning in AT&T Mobility that arbitration of a “type
of claim”82 cannot be prohibited, and a class of individuals cannot be “incompetent to sign
arbitration agreements.”83
V.

COMMENTARY

The Supreme Court’s holding that the Clark-Kindred arbitration agreement must be
enforced, but remand of the Wellner-Kindred arbitration agreement leaves a significant
unanswered question.84 The Supreme Court only ruled on the issue of whether the clear
statement rule violated the FAA, but it did not analyze what must be included in a power-ofattorney document to grant authority to the agent to bind the principal to an arbitration
agreement. Instead, the Court left that determination to the state courts, with the only added
guidance of not applying the clear statement rule, or other similar state rules, when making the
decision.85 In Kindred’s petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the respondents urged the Court to
address the issue as state and federal courts conflict regarding authority granted in powers-ofattorney.86 Kindred noted that it is “commonplace” for attorneys-in-fact to sign admission and
arbitration documents for residents.87 Kindred noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not
rule that the Wellner-Kindred agreement was invalid because of the clear statement rule, but
77

Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1427-28.
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Id. at 1428.
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Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357-358 (2008).
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Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1428.
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Id. at 1429.
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because the court found the principal’s constitutional right to trial by jury was not “related” to
“personal property.”88 However, Kindred failed to present this issue in the question presented to
the Supreme Court.89 Nonetheless, Kindred described the issue as “exceptionally important”
because the state courts narrowly interpreting powers-of-attorney and federal courts applying a
broad interpretation creates “unfairness to litigants . . . unable to remove cases from state to
federal court.”90 This goes against the spirit of the FAA – creating a “uniform national policy
favoring arbitration.”91 Justice Abramson’s dissent in Extendicare Homes also addressed this
issue.92
Justice Abramson noted, the majority’s distinction that found the Wellner-Kindred
agreement invalid (while the Clark-Kindred agreement was valid, but for the clear statement
rule) was the power-of-attorney only granted Ms. Wellner authority to make “contracts of every
nature in relation to both real and personal property” [emphasis added].93 The majority reasoned
that by limiting authority to property, the power-of-attorney did not relate to arbitration over
negligence or injury.94 The majority relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 (2006)95
and Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 comment h. (2006)96 in determining “there are some
acts with such consequences for the principal that a reasonable agent would not believe that he or
she had been authorized to engage in them.” The majority found that a power-of-attorney that
only contained “general language” or restricted the agent’s authority to “property” did not allow
the agent to enter arbitration agreements on the principal’s behalf because it would create legal
consequences that the agent should not believe the principal intended.97 Justice Abramson argued
that the majority erred in two ways with the application of the Restatement. First, Justice
Abramson noted that the majority’s interpretation singles out arbitration in a manner prohibited
by the FAA.98 Second, Justice Abramson argued that a power-of-attorney that relates only to
88

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *16, Kindred, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 16-32) (quoting Extendicare Homes, 478
S.W.3d at 326).
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Id. at 347.
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The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 (2006) states “an agent has actual authority to take action designated or
implied in the principal’s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary and incidental to achieving the principal’s
objectives.”
95

The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 comment h. (2006) states “some acts that are otherwise legal create
legal consequences for a principal that are significant and separate from the transaction specifically directed by the
principal. A reasonable agent should consider whether the principal intended to authorize the commission of
collateral acts. . . .”
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property still grants authority to sign arbitration agreements.99 A “chose in action” is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] proprietary right . . . such as . . . a claim for damages in tort.”100
Therefore, the agent has authority to bind the principal to arbitration for a tort claim, including
personal injury, because “choses in action are personal property.”101 Justice Abramson concluded
that courts must find “[t]he grant of an unqualified power to contract is necessarily ‘express
authorization’ to agree to dispute resolution through arbitration agreement.”102 By not addressing
this issue, the Supreme Court of the United States left the potential for state courts to
“discriminat[e] against arbitration in the guise of application of general principles of state
law.”103
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Kindred, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding in
favor of Clark. The Court found that the Kentucky Supreme Court erred in finding that the FAA
did not preempt the clear statement rule. The Court found the Clark-Kindred agreement was
valid, and the Kentucky Supreme Court must compel arbitration, per Kindred’s request.104 The
Supreme Court remanded the Wellner action for the court to review whether preempting the
clear statement rule disturbed the court’s finding that Ms. Wellner’s power-of-attorney did not
grant authority to enter an arbitration agreement on Mr. Wellner’s behalf.105 The Court did not
address how states should interpret whether a power-of-attorney is sufficiently broad to enter
arbitration agreements. This omission will likely lead to additional litigation on the issue. The
Court should hold, in accordance with the rule suggested by Justice Abramson, that the grant of
contract power, without qualifications, sufficiently authorizes the agent to agree to dispute
resolution.106 This rule would prevent additional discrepancies between state and federal
interpretation of principles of law and would further the creation of a uniform national policy
favoring arbitration.
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